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Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies are still in its initial stage in Malaysia
so the existence of C02 pipeline network relatively small which leads to the unadequate
understanding ofrisk associated with CO2 release. In this project, risk-based approaches
are used to evaluate the possible risks may occur when carbon dioxide (CO2) is
transported in pipelines from its source to desired destinations. There are two case
studies are presented. The first one is the risk analysis of CO2 pipeline networkonshore
and the second one is about the comparison study of risk between the C02 and natural
gas pipeline in order to raise awareness of the order ofmagnitude of CO2 risk.
It is found that C02 pipelinemay represent significantrisks once a large amount of C02
is released close to dense population. This project also proposes some mitigation
methods of the relevant risks regarding the current practices.
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Greenhouse gases have been one of the main sources caused global warming in which
carbon dioxide (C02) is the most critical component so there is an urgent demand to
reduce CO2 emission to the atmosphere. Currently Carbon dioxide Capture and Storage
(CCS) technology is considered as the most effective method to reduce CO2 exhaust.
Carbon capture technologies can potentially remove 80 - 95% of CO2 emitted from an
electrical power plant or other industrial sources. CCS consists of three parts which are
capture, transportation and sequestration in geological formations as in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Schematic diagram ofpossible CCS systems (Courtesy ofC02CRC)
Due to its effectiveness, CCS attracts attention of manycountries all over the world and
becomes the target research. Below is the list of four largest projects are in operation
which are considered as samples for other CCS-related activities. Please refer
Appendix A for more details abouttheseprojects.






The Sleipner CCS project Norway 1 1996
The IEA GHG Weyburn-Midale C02
monitoring and storage Weyburn project
Canada 1.6 2000
The In Salah CCS project Algeria 0.8 2004
The Sn0hvit CCS project Norway 0.7 2008
Nevertheless, the research programs are mainly focus on the capture technologies, on
how to remove CO2 efficiently and economically which results in unintentionally
leaving out the vital component, CO2 transportation since many oil and gas fields are in
remote regions which is required certain carrier network to bring CO2 to target
destinations.
The goal of this project is to investigate any potential risk related to CO2 transportation
pipeline on land from the source to the desired destination for CCS purpose.
1.2. Problem Statement
Parfomak and Folge (2007) states the incidents were caused by CO2 are relatively small
in comparison with by natural gas. It was proven by the historical data recorded by
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), in the United States, records that there were 12 leaks
from CO2 pipelines reported from 1986 through 2006 — none resulting in injuries to
people. In contrast, there were 5,610 accidents causing 107 fatalities and 520 injuries
related to natural gas and hazardous liquids (excluding CO2) pipelines during the same
period.
However, it cannot be concluded that the risk of CO2 is insignificant and can be
negligible since the CO2 pipelines possess less than 1% of total natural gas and
hazardous liquid pipelines (5,000km C02 pipeline in comparison with 490,850km
natural gas pipeline in United State only). And one reason carbon dioxide pipeline
accidents are rare is because we do not really have that many CO2 pipelines in use.
Accidents related to CO2 will likely increase once the number of pipelines grows.
Moreover, the CO2 pipelines currently travel through remote areas only.
In fact, exposure to CO2 gas, as for other asphyxiates, may cause rapid circulatory
insufficiency, coma, and death. History verified C02 fatal side by catastrophe occurred
in 1986 in Cameroon, when a cloud of naturally-occurring CO2 spontaneously released
from Lake Nyos killed 1,700 people and 3,500 livestock in nearby villages.
Undoubtedly, once the CCS is widely implemented, the number of C02 pipelines will
increase dramatically and get closer to the population which implies the evident risk of
CO2 incidents to environment as well as residence.
In Malaysia, the CCS technology is still in its budding stage whereby in the year 1999,
the first commercial plant at 200 tC02/day recovery from a flue gas has been in
operation for urea production (equivalent to the emission from a lOMWt coal-fired
power plant).
In 2009, Malaysia officially joined the global CCS Institute (GCCSI), Australia with the
hopes of promoting the CCS technology in Malaysia to mitigate its carbon footprint.
Apart from environmental protection, CCS is also a green economic driver and has the
potential to nurture a whole new industry in green technology and contribute to
Malaysia's economic growth. New job opportunities will also be created in Malaysia
through CCS.
1.3. Objectives and Scope of Study
• To evaluate the risks associated with CO2 pipelines release;
• To raise awareness to industrial and community by comparing the degree of risk
between CO2 and natural gas;
• To recommend suitable mitigation methods to reduce/eliminate its potential
risks;
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY
2.1. Review of incidents (accidents/deaths) caused by carbon dioxide
According to National Response Center's database, a total of 13 accidents related to
CO2 pipelines occurred in the US between 1986 and 2008. Of these 13 accidents, none
had reported human injuries or fatalities, compared to the more than 5,000 accidents
and 107 fatalities in the same period caused by natural gas and hazardous liquid
pipelines (Parfomak and Folger 2007). Below is the detail of 13 C02-accidents:























Regulated/semi-truck ran into a
structure
2 Oklahoma Transpectco Air
11/19/2000
Strong odor reported from
private citizen and confirmed
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14in. distribution line leaked
C02 and H2S into the
atmosphere
Third-party company contracted
a backhoe and hit a carbon
dioxide underground pipeline
during digging.
8in. transmission pipeline failed
due to corrosion and caused
material to release
Release ofC02 due to valve
failure
A leak was found on the CRC
pipeline releasing C02
A magnetic flux leakage (MFL)
pig was struck in a pipeline and
when efforts were made to
remove the object, the line
developed a crack and
discharged C02 in to the air.
C02 was released to the
atmosphere from a 20in.
underground pipeline.
An ice mound formed on a line
used for liquid C02 injection
from Texas to Oklahoma due to
a pinhole leak.


































3. Unknown 4. Under investigation
Based on the very little C02 incidents reported, Duncan et al. (2009) has declared that
the CO2 transportation and injection associated with enhanced oil recovery (CO2-EOR)
has an excellent safety record. However, those historical data will not applicable
anymore when the number of CO2 pipeline increases once the CCS is widely employed.
Those historical numbers also implicate that the current practices involved CO2 is very
limited. As a result, Connolly (2007) has stated that "There is relatively little experience
worldwide in managing risks associated with CO2, compared with oil and gas".
2.2. Literature review
The risk related to CO2 becomes an evident concern as the CCS activities are increasing
rapidly and plays an important role in climate change reduction. This concern has been
studied and mentioned by many group of scientists worldwide. Most of them agreed
that the potential risk of CO2 cannot be neglected and overlooked, careful and detail
study should be carried out to estimate any potential risk.
Barrie et al. (2004) suggest that before doing a quantitative analysis comparing the risks
associated with CO2 injection and transportation with natural gas, it is desirable to get
an improved understanding of CO2-EOR industries safety record.
At the present, almost C02 is transported through remote areas so that its impacts are
not clearly noticeable. With the deployment of CCS projects in some regions as
Northwest Europe, a huge CO2 pipeline networks will be closer to dense population. It
will result in the potential for leakage from a pipeline in close proximity to residential
areas to cause a Major Accident Hazard (MAH) due to the toxicity and asphyxiant of
C02 (Connolly, 2007), which incidentally, is currently not defined as a dangerous fluid
under PSR.
Moonis and Wilday (2008) recommended further investigation into the possibility of
including CO2 as a dangerous fluid under Pipeline Safety Regulation (PSR) since CO2
is not currently regulated as a dangerous fluid. This work suggested that in terms of
hazard range and hazard footprint area, CO2 should be categorized as a dangerous
substance but further analysis would be required in terms of risk. McGillivray and
Wilday (2009) continued Moonis and Wilday's work and concluded that CO2 used for
CCS has sufficient toxicity to be regulated as a dangerous fluid under the Pipeline
Safety Regulation.
In case a substantial amount of CO2 could be released and the concentrations of CO2 in
the air were to surpass 8%, the effects would be lethal to anybody nearby. Although the
regulation for the structural integrity of C02 pipeline is about 30 - 36 times (capacity of
365 MPa) that of operational pressure, 9.6 MPa, there are still risks associated with
transporting huge amounts of C02 (Balat, 2009).
According to IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage from
Cambridge University, a sudden and large release of CO2 which has concentration
greater than 7-10% by volume in air would pose immediate dangers to human life and
health. In such manner, this certain report suggests that pipeline transport of CO2
through populated areas requires attention to route selection, overpressure protection,
leak detection and other design factors.
2.3. Risk assessment techniques
Risk assessment comprises of incident identification and consequence analysis. Incident
identification describes how an incident occurs. It frequently includes an analysis of the
probabilities. Consequence estimation is to determine the potential for damage and
injury from identified incidents.
In order to determine the actual risk of a chemical process or plant, some methods are
employed such as qualitative risk analysis, quantitative risk analysis (QRA) or layer of
protection analysis (LOPA), where the QRA and LOPA are the most common
techniques.
In this project, QRA is chosen due to its advantage as following:
• QRA can be applied at any stage in the life of a facility. Maximum benefits
result when QRA is applied at the beginning (conceptual and design stages) of a
project and maintained throughout its life.
• QRA provides a quantitative method to evaluate risk and to identify areas for
cost-effective risk reduction.
• QRA is used to help evaluate potential risks where qualitative methods cannot
provide adequate understanding of the risks and more information is needed for
risk management. It can also be used to evaluate alternative risk reduction
strategies.
2.4. Quantitative risk assessment (QRA)
2.4.1. QRA procedure
QRA component techniques are flexible and can be applied selectively, in various
orders. The general procedure is outlined in Figure 2.1 below; it has been designed in
such a way to shorten the time and effort needed to achieve the desired results.
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Figure 2.1: The QRAprocedure
2.4.2. QRA database






















3.1.1. CO2 is non-flammable
Based on the physical properties below, carbon dioxide is not classified as a flammable
substance so that in QRA the fire and explosion probabilities will be eliminated.
Appearance: colourless odourless gas Vapour density: 1.53 (air = 1)
Boiling point: -78°C (sublimes) Density (g cm"3): 1.101 at -37°C
Critical temperature: 31.6°C Critical pressure: 73.8 atm.
Flash point: none Explosion limits: none
Auto-ignition temperature: none Water solubility: slight
3.1.2. CO2 is an asphyxiant
Gas encyclopedia states that workers briefly exposed to very high concentrations
showed damage to the retina, sensitivity to light (photophobia), abnormal eye
movements, constriction of visual fields, and enlargement of blind spots. Several deaths
have been attributed to exposure to concentrations greater than 20%. Effects of CO2 can
become more pronounced upon physical exertion, such as heavy work. Please refer
Appendix C for more information about effect of CO2 to human health.
Due to this fact, in the proposed QRA, the toxicity of C02 will be evaluated with the
worst setup scenarios in order to estimate how it affects the community.
3.1.3. CO2 is heavier than air
Since the vapordensityof C02 is much heavier than of air, the normal dispersion model
such as Gaussian dispersion models do not accurately stimulate dense gas as C02
discharges. Hence, we may use dense mathematical models such as Computational
11
Fluid Dynamics (CFD) or dimensional analysis as Britter and Quaid (1988) model for a
sophisticated estimation.
3.1.4. CO2 is corrosive
CO2 corrosion results from the attack of carbonic acid gases, which dissolve in water on
the pipe walls and other equipment. The resulting corrosion reaction is as follows:
H2CO3 + Fe -» Fe2+ + CO32" + H2
The above corrosion reaction can result in the formation of stable corrosion product
films (FeC03, Fe203, Fe304) which may reduce corrosion rates over time. The
formation and stabilization of the corrosion product films are temperature and flow rate
dependent.
3.2. Dense gas dispersion
When a gas whose density is greater than the density of the ambient air is released, it
initially behaves completely different from a neutrally buoyant gas. The heavy gas will
first slump or sink, because it is heavier than the surrounding air. As the gas cloud
moves downwind, gravity makes it spread; this can cause some of the vapor to travel
upwind of its release point as Figure 3.1. Farther downwind, as the cloud becomes
more diluted and its density approaches that of air, it begins behaving like a neutrally
buoyant gas. This takes place when the concentration of heavy gas in the surrounding
air drops below about 1 percent (10,000 parts per million). For many small releases, this
will occur in the first few meters. For large releases, this may happen much further
downwind.
Wia*
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Figure 3.1: Heavy gas dispersion
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There are different methods to predict the dense gas dispersion behavior, in this project;
a modeling approach, PHAST Risk version 6.53, is used due to its capability of heavy
gas calculation and its availability in Simulation lab of UTP's Chemical department.
The principles of PHAST Risk version 6.53 was described in the following section.
3.2.1. Heavy-gas Entrainment
Dense gas and aerosol clouds are known to suppress dispersion below that obtained by
ambient turbulence (passive dispersion) in the surrounding atmosphere. This
phenomenon is described in the UDM (Unified Dispersion Model) by making the
dominant (top) entrainment velocity depend on the layer Richardson number, an
indicator of cloud buoyancy.
3.2.2. Heavy-gas entrainment for instantaneous plume
For an instantaneous release the heavy gas entrainment rate Ehvy (kg/s) is given by:
Bk vy
v*
Ry Utide Aside Utep Jjsep) Pa.
(1)
where uSide is the horizontal air-entrainment velocity through the plume side-area ASide,
u[op is the vertical air-entrainment velocity through the plume top-area Atop. The side
area ASide and the top area Atop correspond to an instantaneous plume of cylindrical
shape with height Heff(l+hd) and radius Weff:
A5ide = 2KW^H^Q. +hd) , A^ = *W%
(2)
Note that the term [Wgnd/Ry] in equation above ensures that the heavy-gas entrainment
is not applied for an elevated plume, is phased in during touching down and phased out
during lifting-off.
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3.2.3. Heavy-gas entrainment for continuous plume
For a continuous cloud the heavy gas entrainment rate Ehvy (kg per second per unit of





where the cloudwidth and height are chosen to correspond to the effective cloudwidth
2Weffand the effective cloud height HefiO+hd).
3.2.4. Side Entrainment Velocity
The side surfaceentrainment velocity is taken to be proportional to the spread rate or
(4)
where y is an edge-entrainment coefficient. For a continuous release the side
entrainment is ignored [y =0].
3.2.5. Top entrainment velocity
The top surface entrainment generally dominates over the side entrainment exceptvery
near the source.The top surfaceentrainment velocity utop is formulated to have the same
functionality as thevertical dispersion coefficient, K2. Thatis, fora vertical wind profile
in a power law form:
•AilUa.(z)~Ua.(zr
(5)
Kzsatisfies the two-dimensional dispersion relationship:
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with a functional form given by:
(6)
*fiW (7)
where k =0.4 is the Von Karman constant, and O the entrainment function of the
Richardson number Ri*.
To retain this form, the top-entrainment velocity utop is defined by:
3.2.6. Richardson number, entrainment function
The layerRichardson Number is definedby:
(9)PaM*
where zcid is the centre-line height.
The entrainment function 0(Ri*) represents the phenomenon that heavy gases (Ri*>0)
tend to suppress turbulent mixing within a cloud below that of ambient turbulence. On
the other hand, positively buoyant clouds (Ri*<0) lifting off are known to have





= (1 +0.S Ri^^/1.7 2.3633 <Ri^< 14.72
= Ri*/7 Ri„> 14.72
Cio)
For Ri* < 0, the above formula is taken from the correlation adopted by Havens and
Spicer for the model DEGADIS.
For Ri* > 0, the formulation adopted by Witlox (1989) is adopted. The latter
formulation is based on an entrainment function proposed by Britter (1988). It is close
to those adopted by DEGADIS and the HGSYSTEM model AEROPLUME. In addition
the above function does accurately fit experimental data for a wide range of Richardson
numbers.
3.3. Risk determination
3.3.1. Rate of Death
This is the expected number of fatalities on an annual basis, calculated as follows:
*rf = E E F.rJl_^ (ID
where Fedf,o is the frequency of a given outcome for a given Model, and Nedf,o is the
number of fatalities associated with that outcome.
3.3.2. Risk Integral (based on Aversion Integral = 1.2)
M* = II F«Jf$> (12)
where Fed/,0 is the frequency of a given outcomefor a given Model, Nedf,0 is the number
of fatalities associated with that outcome, and ai is an aversion index, set to 1.2 for this
calculation.
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3.3.3. Risk Integral (Land Use)
NIVP = II F«AN«*+Nlfr)/2 (13)
AH s^k a
where Fedf,0 is the frequency of a given outcome for a given Model, and Nedf,o is the
number of fatalities associated with that outcome.
3.3.4. Potential Loss of Life (Individual Risk Based)
All x.j?
where Nx,y is the population in a given cell in the grid used for the risk calculations, and
IRTot,x,y is the level of individual risk calculated for the centre of that cell.
3.3.5. Potential Loss of Life (Societal Risk Based)
This is based on the FN Curve Data as follows:
CO
PLLs^YjNx.F(N) (15)
where A' is the lower limit of one of the ranges of fatalities used in the table of FN
Curve Data and F(N) is the frequency of fatalities in that range.
The value for this measure will be lower than the value for the Rate of Death since the
Rate of Death is calculated with the exact number of fatalities for each outcome,
whereas this measure is calculated with the lower limit for the range.
3.4. Specific CO2-QRA
Figure 3.2 below shows the QRA model which is specific for CO2 pipelines only.
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Figure 3.2: Specific C02 QRA
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3.5. Software used
There are two proposed software to do the dispersion and risk stimulation for CO2
release.
- PHAST Risk 6.53 (Software for the Assessment of Flammable, Explosive and
Toxic Impact): commercial consequence modeling software developed by DNV
(Det Norske Veritas). It is designed to perform all the analytical, data processing
and results presentation elements of a QRA within a structured framework.
Phast Risk analyses complex consequences from accident scenarios, taking
account of local population and weather conditions, to quantify the risks
associated with the release of hazardous chemicals.
- Excel
3.6. Software validation
In this work, Phast risk version 6.53 was used to evaluate the release consequences
altogether with risks. Unfortunately, in Phast risk v6.53 database, C02 is considered as
inert material as in Figure 3.3 which means there is no risk associated with this
particular chemical.
MmmIbI Rlafc , ScwaiD - Pit™ <VhhI { LooaHon • Snmbf - Bund •>*)
Dj*ch*igs MaMrial
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Figure 3.3: CO2 is an inert chemical in Phast risk database
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In order to overcome this problem, the intensive literature review was carried out. After
doing the comparison with other toxic chemical in Phast risk and McGillivray &
J.Wilday (2009), some default settings were changed as in Table 4.5.
Table 3.1: Changes made in PHASTrisk
Default value Changed value
Droplet evaporation 0.001 1E-6
Droplet thermodynamic
model






height for calculation of effect: lm
The comparison on consequences with other available works was done to make sure the
C 1
changed parameters is really work for CO2case. 7
—><_ $ c
The chosen one is carried out by p Koornneef et al/ In their work, two commercial
software packages developed by TNO: EFFECTS and RISKCURVES are used.








Maximum cone, (ppm) 255,300 1,040,000
Catastrophic
ruptureDistance downwind (m) 20-25 104
Horizontal
Maximum cone, (ppm) 50,090 50,000
Leak
Distance downwind (m) 15-22 105
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From Table 3.2, there was a huge deviation between the Phast risk and J. Koornneef et
al. for instantaneous release but for the horizontal release case these both models gave
almost the same value.
These two models give different results which do not indicate that one model or
methodology is necessarily better than any other but that these models are formulated
differently. Even when two models have the same basic mathematical formulation,
different results may produced since different sets of data may have been used to
calibrate them. One problem is that it is not practical to run experiments under all
combinations of different chemicals, different release rates, different wind speeds,
different surface roughness conditions, different atmospheric stabilities, and look at
different concentration averaging times. What is done is to develop empirical
expressions or algorithms from a limited data set and assume that the relationships hold
true for conditions not tested.
However, in terms of risk, both Phast risk v6.53 and J. Koornneef et al. have risk
contour from lxlO"5 to lxl0"9/average year. Moreover, Phast risk produced higher
consequences for weather stability class F (2m/s) than class B (2m/s). This point is
proven by McGillivray &^Wilday (2009) andJ^Koornneef, et al. (2010).
Due to those facts, it could be concluded that Phast risk v6.53 after changing certain
defaultdata can work well for C02 releaseespecially leak scenarios.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDY 1: C02 RISK ANALYSIS
4.1. The Great Plains Synfuels Plant, Dakota, USA
Dakota Gasification Company (DGC) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Basin Electric
Power Cooperative and a North Dakota corporation, owns and operates the Great Plains
Synfuels Plant, which is located nearBeulah, NorthDakota.
DGC sells the compressed carbon dioxide to two companies in Saskatchewan: EnCana
Oil & Gas Partnership and Apache Canada, Ltd., which use this carbon dioxide for
enhanced oil recovery (EOR) at their Weyburn oil field and Midale oil field,
respectively. The first CQ2 was sentto Canada in October 2000.
Figure 4.1: The Great Plains Synfiiels Plant
Today, Dakota Gas exports about 152 million cubic feet per day of C02 to Canada -
about 50 percent of the C02 produced when running at full rates. As of Dec. 31, 2009,




Figure 4.2: C02emission reduction atDGC's Synfiiel Plant
The Synfuels Plant's unique gasification operations and C02 capture and
transport continue to draw worldwide attention. Visitors from Germany, China, Italy,
Korea, Great Britain and Japan, the United States and other nations have toured their
facilities. National media from 60 Minutes, The History Channel, and Fox News, and
television reporters from London, Tokyo, and Montreal have produced reports and
special programs about the plant.
The Synfuels plant isa coal gasification plant that uses a Lurgi coal gasification process
to gasify lignite coal into gases and liquids. The plant consumes approximately 17,000
tons of lignite per day. When production is dedicated to synthetic gas production, the
plant produces approximately 160 million standard cubic feet per day of synthetic
natural gas. As byproducts, the plant produces a combination of krypton/xenon gas,
liquid nitrogen, cresylic acid, phenol, ammonium sulfate and carbon dioxide. As a co-











Figure 4.3: Great Plains Synfuels Plantprocessflow diagram
C02 pipeline routine is 204.8 miles length from the Great Plains Synfuels Plant near
Beulah, North Dakota, USA to the GoodWater Unit, this is part of Cenovus Energy's
Weyburn oil field in Saskatchewan, Canada. Please refer Appendix F for further details
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Figure 4.4: Pipeline routinefrom Great Plains Synfiiel Plant, Dakota to Weyburn
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Table 4.1: Pipelineoperating conditions






14" X70 2700 3375 240
12.75" X70 2964 3705
C02 from other power plants is very wet and diluted with nitrogen and oxygen and
requires further processing, butDakota Gas' process results in a C02 stream that is very
dryand96percent pure, sono additional processing is needed.











When supercritical gaseous C02 is transported in the pipeline, there are many risks
associated such as following:
S Choke: C02 velocity may increase alongthe pipeline and result in building up to
a veryhighpressure or choking condition at a certain distance.
S Corrosion: As in section 3.1 stated that C02 is a corrosive chemical so if there is
a significant amount of water exist in the pipeline it may increase the corrosion
rate which leads to higher failure frequencies.
S Failure due to puncture, fullbore rupture or third party (corrosion, material
defects, operator errors, etc.)
S Two phase flow
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S Reverse flow
S Pressure reduction failure leads to no or low flow.
•S Blockagedue to valve closureor solidification.
4.1.2. Select incidents
Since the historical data in Table 2.1 shows that majority ofC02 pipeline incidents was
caused by equipments failure, corrosion and operator errors, in this project, the risk
related to equipment failures wasinvestigated through twomajor types of failure:
> Catastrophic rupture
> Leak
The information in Table 2.1 on C02 pipeline incidents will be used to estimate the
failure rate as displayed in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Failureratesfor COjpipelines
Failure Mode
Total dumber of Accident
Between 19S6 ami 2003 Percentage
Hktoiic.il Failure Rate per
Mile of Carbon Dioxide
Pipeline per year
Equipment Failure 6 46 7.77E-G5
Corrosion 2 15.5 170E-05
Operation Error 2 115 Z70E-05
Unknown 3 23 3.S9E-05
Total 13 100 1.69E-04
A sensitivity analysis was performed to study the effect of operating conditions on the
C02 releases. The details of this are shown in Table 4.4 below.
Table 4.4: Setup scenarios







1 1900 2700 40 F Catastrophic
rupture
2 1900 2700 40 D
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3 1900 2700 40 F
Leak (20mm)
4 1900 2700 40 D
5 1900 5000 40 F Catastrophic
rupture
6 1900 5000 40 D
7 1900 5000 40 F
Leak (20mm)
8 1900 5000 40 D
9 5000 2700 40 F Catastrophic
rupture
10 5000 2700 40 D
11 5000 2700 40 F
Leak (20mm)
12 5000 2700 40 D
4.1.3. Determination of consequences
Since the tool forconsequence andrisk estimation wasproven cando itswork properly,
the project proceeded with analyzing case study.










1 100,500 28824.5 -75 to 75 1 (-55 to 75)
2 29,750 73,676.4 -120 to 180 1 (-60 to 70)
3 52,060 32.33 13.5 to 33 1(0 to 15)
4 57,570 4.54 15.5 to 22.5 1(0 to 14)
5 119,100 29053.8 -80 to 100 1 (-62 to 83)
6 33,700 73842.5 -120 to 180 1 (-62 to 78)
7 53,660 47.8961 14 to 37 1(0 to 17)
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8 52,350 33.2082 14 to 34 1(0 to 17)
9 100,500 55786.7 -90 to 135 1 (-76 to 104)
10 26,020 160244 -200 to 250 1 (-95 to 100)
11 52,060 32.33 13.5 to 22.5 1(0 to 14.5)
12 57,570 4.53 15.5 to 22.4 1(0 to 14)
4.1.4. Determination of risk
Table 4.6: Risk results
Scenario






Avg outcome Risk integral
1 - - - - -
2 - - - - -
3 - - - - -
4 - - - - -
5 - - - - -
6 - - - - -
7 - - - - -
8 - - - - -
9 2.05E-5 1.32E-1 79 1.00E+1 1.56E-4
10 2.13E-6 5.03E-2 62 3.44E-H) 2.14E-4









The sensitivity study with total of 12 scenarios setup were carried out, only Scenario 9
and 10 produce unacceptable risk to residence nearby so the risk of C02 release in
pipeline is strongly influenced by the amount ofrelease. But this result isapplicable for
average time of600 seconds and duration up to 3600 seconds only. Incase of long-term
health effects, majority of 12 cases (except Scenario 2, 6 and 10) will cause some
certain effects to any human nearby. In Canada's Occupational Health and Safety state
if the anyworker is exposed to the concentration in the range of 10,000ppm to 15,000
for duration of 42 - 44 days will result in e a reversible acid-base imbalance in the blood
and an increased volume of air inhaled per minute. Please refer Appendix D for more
information about toxicity ofCO2published by Canada.
There is no risk for all leak case with diameter of 20mm so the sensitivity study of hole
diameter was performed to estimate which hole diameter can expose significant risk.
For the Scenario 3 and 4 there is unacceptable risk if the hole diameter is more than
100mm for 14 inches (355.6mm). And for the Scenario 7 and 8 in which the operating
pressure is almost doubled, there isno unacceptable risk if the hole diameter is less than
85mm for samepipeline size.The same situation goes for Scenario 11 and 12.
For C02, if it does not expose any risk, it will be very safe but once the incident occurs
the damage is expected high. Like in Scenario 9 and 10, the percentage of fatality can
reach up to 79% ofthe population.
4.2. Malaysian F-N curve
The F-N curve is a common measure of societal risk. The numerical limits which cross
the x and y axes and the slopes for the F-N line differ from countries to countries
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<0.3 - - - - - - - - 11.0 11.0
0.3 -1.5 0.8 1.5 3.1 1.6 11.1 12.6 2.8 0.8 - 34.3
1.6-3.3 2.2 6.8 8.5 1.7 5.8 6.0 1.3 0.6 - 32.9
3.4-5.4 2.2 7.4 5.1 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 - 16.8
5.5-7.9 0.4 2.0 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 - 3.3
8.0-10.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.1
>10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0
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Figure4.5: Malaysian F-Ncurvefor CO2
Based on the F-N curve above, there is still intolerable risk.
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CHAPTERS
CASE STUDY 2: COMPARISON STUDY OF RISK BETWEEN C02
AND NATURAL GAS PIPELINES
5.1. Natural gas pipelines
Natural gas is a mixtureofvarious hydrocarbon gases such as methane, ethane,propane
and butane, etc. Over 70% of natural gas is formed by ethane. So it is reasonable to do
risk analysisfor naturalgas via methane, the major component.
Table 5J: Physical properties ofmethane
Molecular weight 16.043 g/mol
Critical temperature -82.7 °C
Critical pressure 45.96 bar
Heat capacity at constant pressure (Cp) 0.035 kJ/(mol.K)
Heat capacity at constant volume (Cv) 0.027 kJ/(mol.K)
Gas density at boiling point 1.819 kg/m^
Gas density at 15 °C 0.68 kg/m3
Autoignition temperature 595 °C
5.2. Result & discussion
Table 5.2: Comparison result between C02 and naturalgas
Max. cone
(ppm)





C02 (toxic) 100,500 28824.5 - -
Natural gas
(flammable)
1.65E+5 10636.1 1.08E-3/avgyear 1.09E-3/avgyear
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1,900m*, 40°C, 2700psig, Dayweather
C02 (toxic) 29,750 73,676.4 - -
Natural gas
(flammable)
1.65E+5 10245 6.28E-4 6.42E-4
5,000m4,40°C, 2700psig, Night weather
C02 (toxic) 100,500 55786.7 2.25E-3 1.98E-3
Natural gas
(flammable)
1.65E+5 20515.1 1.69E-3 1.61E-3
5,000m3,40°C, 2700psig, Dayweather
C02 (toxic) 26,020 160244 9.34E-4 8.71E-4
Natural gas
(flammable)
1.65E+5 19668 6.28E-4 6.42E-4
As shown in Table 5.2 above, in case of huge release, the degree of risk of CO2 is






- TheCO2 may cause serious problem to residence if huge amount of CO2 is
released and its impacts are relatively comparative to which caused by natural
gas.
- Operating pressure is the most critical parameter which can make great change
in C02 concentration in comparison with volume and temperature.
- The night weather (class F) accumulates higher concentration than the day
weather (class D) for the same amount of released CO2 as well as operating
conditions.
Nevertheless, there are still some limitations due to:
• Incomplete or inadequate enumeration of incidents;
• Improper selection of incidents;
• Unavailability of required data such as frequencies;
• Consequence or frequency model assumption.
5.2. Recommendation
Since the outcome of this project verified that the carbon dioxide may make certain
impacts on community and especially environment if any failure is occurred. Knowing
the potential risk of CO2 transportation pipeline, manycountries such as United States,
Netherland, United Kingdom, Norway, etc. have been developing a national regulation
for CCS to promote the safe C02 transportation and handle. In case of Malaysia, at
present, there is no legislation or regulation regarding CO2 capture, transportation &
storage. So it is highly recommended that Malaysia should create standard or
framework to support the application of CCS widely.
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5.2.1. A national regulatory framework
The most important single conclusion to be drawn from this research is the need for
industry to classify C02 as hazardous material and develop a regulatory framework to
allow the appropriate approach for all C02 projects orlocations in terms oftechnologies
and environmental concerns.
Before any project related to C02 is approved to implement, a risk assessment must be
conducted to determine what the significant effects would be from the project to
residence as well as environment and propose the potential mitigation measures. For
example in United State, they have so called Electronic Code Federal Regulations for
the transportation of hazardous liquids and carbon dioxide by pipeline. In this
regulation, a detail guideline about annual report, design requirement, construction,
operation and maintenance, etc. isprovided to guarantee the safe transportation.
5.2.2. Standard industrial practices
In order to prevent and control any potential accidental carbon dioxide releases, the
industry has developed standard mean to maintain the reliability and safe operation of
pipelines in addition to design, construct, operate and maintain the carbon dioxide
pipeline inaccordance with applicable laws, ordinances, regulations, and standards.
Based on the current practice of some typical companies, the following factors are
considered in defining control andmitigation measures forpipeline safety:
• To reduceexposureto a failure mechanism;
• To increase the resistance to a failure mechanism;
• To mitigate the effect of a failure;
• To limit the impact ofa failure on environment.
Pipeline construction requirement
- Pipeline design pressure and temperature must be designed in the manner to
minimize the potential of C02 release.
- Burial ofpipeline should be employed to limitthe release of C02.
- Pipe material selection
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- External internal-corrosion control
- Block valves: block valves will be installed on the carbon dioxide pipeline to
block-in the pipeline whenever unlikely eventof a loss of integrity.
- Eleven tap points were installed onthepipeline. These taps would allow take-off
of carbon from the pipeline for a potential customer or customers without
forcing a shutdown ofthe pipeline.
- The pipe size: 0.5 inch wall bevel end 14inches API 5L Gr. X65 seamless pipe.
All pipe and field joints will be coated with fusion bonded epoxy (16mils), and
abrasion resistant epoxy (44 mils) and a two-inch concrete jacket weight
coating. Field welds will be 100% radio-graphed. The pipeline will be
hydrostatically tested in accordance with applicable regulation to establish the
maximum allowable operating pressure. Testing will be conducted for a
minimum ofeight hour and will include a leak test.
- Thepipeline should be studied to determine the effectiveness of pipeline safety
systems including leak/rupture detection & automatic block valve closure at
approximately 14locations along thepipeline route. Safety systems aredesigned
to mitigate the potential effects of releases from the pipeline by limiting the
amountofpipeline product that can be released into the atmosphere in the event
of an accidental release.
- A telemetry (SCADA) system provides 24-hour monitoring of the pipeline and
compressor operations, including pressures, temperatures and flow rates. This
telemetry system enhances immediate response capability to any potential
problems. The pipeline is also designed to accommodate an instrumented
internal inspection device to detect and record the type and location of corrosion
or other defects for long-term monitoring of the pipeline integrity.
Pipeline sitting




- Pipeline control: will provide reliable and responsive controls to detect potential
leaks. Real-time monitoring of key parameters, including pressure, temperature,
and flow rate, enables timely intervention in the event ofa release.
- Right-of-way inspections: (interval ofinspection schedule)
- Emergency Response Plan addresses an accidental release of the operating
pipeline and outlines pre-emergency planning and education, operational safety
precautions, emergency response procedures and associated agency
coordination.
5.2.3. Carbon dioxide tax
Since the most factor caused climate change is greenhouse gases in which carbon
dioxide is the main component, it is suggested to impose a carbon tax on oil and gas
production. In such manner, the industrial producers will consider their carbon dioxide
emission as well as look into the CCS technologies to make a clean and green
discharge.
Based on what we learnt from the case study, the Dakota gasification, the
implementation of CO2 capture for conventional power plants is highly recommended
in order to promote a cleaner technology and proceed to green production.
5.2.4. Malaysia CCS
The IPCC Special Report projects that "by 2050, around 20-40% of global fuel C02
emissions could be technically suitable for capture, including 30-60% of power
generation". We can use the case study 1 - Dakota Gasification as our sample for CO2
capture from electrical power plant in Malaysia.
Table 5.1: List ofcoal-firedplant in Malaysia
Plant State MW Type Owner/operator


























































Once this technology is widely employed in Ma aysia the number of C02 pipeline
network will increase rapidly so there is a need to develop a national & technical
framework for CO2 pipeline in a proper manner in order to minimize any potential
hazards.
5.3. Suggestion for future work
The case study chosen for this project whose composition do not have any water but in
practice other CO2 pipeline operators transport CO2 with large amount of water
presence up to 257ppm wt (see Appendix K). The presence of water in C02 pipeline
will introduce hydrate and corrosion formation.
Moreover, the impurities in C02 pipelines such as CH4, H2S or N2 will raise a concern
about how these impurities will affect the release of C02 in caseanyfailure may occur.
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Currently C02 is mainly used for CCS technologies which means CO2 pipelines will
travel offshore and through the seabed so it is desirable to know the potential influence
of CO2 release to the marine life.
Following are some suggestion for future work:
> Effect ofwater presence;
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The Sleipner CCS project, Norway
The first commercial CCS project in the worldwas implemented in Sleipner, one of the
largest gas field in North Sea, 230km off the coast of Norway. The amount of C02
producedwas nearly 3% ofNorway's total emissions in 1990,
The annualized CAPEX-related costs (at a 10% discount rate) were USD 9.6 millions,
while OPEX is about USD 16 per tonne of C02 injected.
The IEA GHG Weyburn-Midale C02 monitoring and storage Weyburn project,
Canada
The Weyburn EOR project currently injects 6,500 tonnes per day of C02, along with
approximately 3,000 tonnes perday of recycled C02. The C02 ispurchased from a coal
gasification plant in North Dakota, United States, and transported through a 320km
pipeline to Weyburn.
Weyburn is also the host site of an international research projecton C02 storage.
The In Salah CCS Project, Algeria
It was designed to test the commercial viability of C02 storage as a C02 mitigation
option. The first phase of the project began in 2004, and involves the injection of up to
4,000 tonnes a day of C02. Gas from the Reg and Tiggentour fields is dehydrated on-
site, transported via pipeline over 100km and then mixed with gas produced from
Kerchba field.
The Sn0hvit CCS project, Norway
The Norwegian SnOhvit CCS project in the Barents Sea is similar in a number of ways
to the Sleipner project. Natural gas containing C02 is transported via a 145km
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multiphase pipeline to the receiving liquefaction plant onshore near the city of
Hammerfest, where it is separated into gas and condensates. C02 is removed from gas
prior to its liquefaction, using an amine process at high pressure. Another 145 km
pipeline has been built to transport this C02 offshore back to SnOhvit field where it is
injected into a 45 - 75km thick formation called Tubasen lying 2,500m below the
seabed. Thecostof thepipeline and injection is estimated at EUR 125 millions.
(Source: Intemarional Energy Agency, 2008, C02 Capture and Storage - A Key Carbon Abatement




Lake Nyos is a crater lake in the Northwest Province of Cameroon, located about
Northwest of Yaounde. Nyos isa deep lake high on the flank of an inactive volcano in
the Oku volcanic plain along the Cameroon line of volcanic activity. A natural dam of
volcanic rock hems in the lake water.
A pocket of magma lies beneath the lake and leaks carbon dioxide into the water,
changing it into carbonic acid. Nyos is one ofthe only three lakes to be saturated with
carbon dioxide in this way, the others being Lake Monoun, at a distance of SSE and
Lake Kivu in Rwanda.
On August 21,1986, possibly triggered by a landslide, the lake suddenly emitted a large
cloud ofcarbon dioxide (1.6 million tones of C02), which suffocated 1,700 people and
3,500 livestock in nearby villages. Though not completely unprecedented, it was the




Carbon Dioxide Safety Information
Carbon dioxide isa compound ofcarbon and oxygen in proportions by weight ofabout
27% carbon to 73% oxygen. It is a gas at normal atmospheric temperatures and
pressures. C02 is colorless, odorless, and about 1.5 times as heavy as air. It is a slightly
acid gas which is felt by some persons tohave a slight pungent odor and biting taste.
Carbon dioxide is relatively non-reactive and nontoxic. It will not burn, and it will not
support combustion or life. When dissolved in water, carbonic acid is formed. Solid
carbon dioxide ("dry ice") is used quite extensively to refrigerate dairy products, meat
products, frozen foods, and other perishable foods while in transit. Gaseous carbon
dioxide is used to carbonate soft drinks, for pH control in water treatment, in chemical
processing, as a food preservative, metal welding and as a growth stimulant for plant
life. Liquid carbon dioxide isused as an expendable refrigerant for freezing and chilling
food products, for stimulation of oil and gas wells, etc.
Acute and chronic health effects
Carbon dioxide is normally present in the atmosphere at about 0.035% by volume. It is
also a normal end product of human and animal metabolism. The exhaled breath
contains up to 5.6% carbon dioxide. The greatest physiological effect of carbon dioxide
is to stimulate the respiratory center, thereby controlling the volume and rate of
respiration. It is ableto cause dilation andconstriction of the blood vessels andhelps to
control the pH of the blood. Carbon dioxide acts as a stimulant and a depressant on the
central nervous system.
Increases in heart rate and blood pressure have been noted at a carbon dioxide
concentration of 7%. Prolonged exposure at this concentration may cause labored
breathing, headache, dizziness, and sweating. Concentrations of 10% and above will
cause unconsciousness in one minute or less. Impairment in coordination has been
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noted during prolonged exposure to concentrations of 3% carbon dioxide evenwhilethe
oxygen concentration was 21 percent.
Inhalation of gaseous carbon dioxide can adversely affect body function. Gaseous
carbon dioxide is an asphyxiant. Concentrations of 10% or more can produce
unconsciousness or death. Lower concentrations may cause headache, sweating, and
rapid breathing, and increased heartbeat, shortness of breath, dizziness, mental
depression, visual disturbances, and shaking.The seriousness of these symptoms is
dependent on concentration and length of time the individual is exposed. Carbon
dioxide when inhaled in elevated concentrations may act to produce mild narcotic
effects, stimulation of the respiratory center, and asphyxiation depending on the
concentration present and the duration of exposure. Chronic effects of C02 have
received little attention and there is very little information availableon long term health
effects from chronic exposure. Skin, eye, or mouth contact with dry ice or compressed
carbon dioxide can cause tissue damage or burns.
The acute effects of carbon dioxide and causal concentrations are listed below:
0.5% or 5,000 ppm OSHAPEL-8hrworkshift
2% or 20,000 ppm May cause deepened breathing
4% or 40,000 ppm May cause marked increase in breathing rate
4.5-5% or 45,000 to 50,000 ppm Breathing becomes labored and distressing to some
individuals
10% or 100,000 ppm May cause visual disturbances, tremors,
perspiration,
increased blood pressure, and loss of consciousness
25% or 250,000 ppm Results in CNS depression, convulsions, coma, and
death
Permissible exposure limit: The OSHA PEL-TWA for carbon dioxide is 5,000.
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Warntag properties: Carbon dioxide is an odorless gas. Since carbon dtox.de . n1, andLI quantitative Mormation is availab.e reiating *—~£
air concents, this product has been treated as amatenal wtth poor warmng
properties.
Respirators: Personnel, including rescue workers should not enter areas in which *e
carbon dioxide content exceeds 3% by measurement unless weanng self-contamed
breathing apparatus or air-line respirators.
First aid care
First aid for inhalation:
. ifaperson has inhaled large amounts ofcarbon dioxide and is exhibiting
adverse effects, move the exposed individual to fresh air at once
. ifbreathing has stopped, perform artificial respiration
• keep the person warm and atrest
• seek medical attention at once
. fresh air and assisted breathing are appropriate for all cases ofoverexposure to
gaseous carbon dioxide
First aid for skin contact:
. if solid carbon dioxide (dry ice) or compressed C02 gas comes in contact with
thebody, stop the exposure at once
• if frostbite has occurred, seek medical attention
First aid for eye contact:














Below 2% Short term No harm
3.3%-5.4% 15 minutes Increase depth ofbreathing
7.5% 15 minutes
Inability of breath (dyspnea), increased
pulserate, headache, dizziness, sweating,
restlessness, disorientation and visual
distortion developed
6.5%-7.5% 20 minutes Decreased mental performance
6.5% 70 minutes Irritability and discomfort
6% Several minutes Affects the heart by altered







Cause a reversible acid-base imbalance
in the blood and an increased volume of
air inhaled per minute (minute volume)
3%
Over 15 hours for 6
days
Decreased night vision and colour
sensitivity
10% 1.5 minutes
Cause eyes flickering, excitation and
increased muscle activity and twitching
Over 10% 1.5 minutes
Difficulty in breathing, impaired hearing,
nausea, vomiting, a strangling sensation,
sweating, stupor within several minutes
and loss of consciousness for 15 minutes
To 30% 1.5 minutes
Quickly unconsciousness and
convulsions




UNITED STATE C02 TRANSPORTATION REGULATION
PART 195—TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS LIQUIDS BY PIPELINE
§ 195.1 Which pipelines are coveredby this part?
(a) Covered. Except for the pipelines listed in paragraph (b) of this section, this part
applies to pipeline facilities and the transportation of hazardous liquids or carbon
dioxide associated with those facilities in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
including pipeline facilities ontheOuter Continental Shelf (OCS). This includes:
(1) Anypipeline that transports a highly volatile liquid (HVL);
(2) Transportation through any pipeline, other than a gathering line, that has a
maximum operating pressure (MOP) greater than 20-percent of the specified minimum
yield strength;
(3) Any pipeline segment that crosses a waterway currently used for commercial
navigation;
(4) Transportation of petroleum in any of the following onshore gathering lines:
(i) A pipeline located in a non-rural area;
(ii) To the extent provided in §195.11, a regulated rural gathering line defined in
§195.11; or
(iii) To the extent provided in §195.413, a pipeline located in an inlet of the Gulf of
Mexico.
(5) Transportation ofa hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide through a low-stress pipeline
or segment ofpipeline that:
(i) Is in a non-rural area; or
(ii) Meets the criteria defined in §195.12(a).
(6) For purposes of the reporting requirements in subpart B, a rural low-stress pipeline
of any diameter.
(b) Excepted. This part does not apply to any of the following:
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(1) Transportation ofa hazardous liquid transported in a gaseousstate;
(2) Transportation of a hazardous liquidthrough a pipeline by gravity;
(3) A pipeline subject to safety regulations of the U.S. CoastGuard;
(4) A low-stress pipeline that serves refining, manufacturing, or truck, rail, or vessel
terminal facilities, if the pipeline is less than one mile long (measured outside facility
grounds) and does not cross an offshore area or a waterway currently used for
commercial navigation;
(5) Transportation of hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide in an offshore pipeline in State
waters where the pipeline is located upstream from the outlet flange of the following
farthest downstream facility: The facility where hydrocarbons or carbon dioxide are
produced or the facility where produced hydrocarbons or carbon dioxide are first
separated, dehydrated, or otherwise processed;
(6) Transportation ofhazardous liquid or carbon dioxide in a pipeline on the OCS where
the pipeline is located upstream of the point at which operating responsibility transfers
from a producing operator to a transporting operator;
(7) A pipeline segment upstream (generally seaward) of the last valve on the last
production facility on the OCS where a pipeline on the OCS is producer-operated and
crosses into State waters without first connecting to a transporting operator's facility on
the OCS. Safety equipment protecting PHMSA-regulated pipeline segments is not
excluded. A producing operator of a segment falling within this exception may petition
the Administrator, under §190.9 of this chapter, for approval to operate under PHMSA
regulations governing pipeline design, construction, operation, and maintenance;
(8) Transportation of a hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide through onshore production
(including flow lines), refining, or manufacturing facilities or storage or in-plant piping
systems associated with such facilities;
(9) Transportation of a hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide:
(i) By vessel, aircraft, tank truck, tank car, or other non-pipeline mode of transportation;
or
(ii) Through facilities located on the grounds of a materials transportation terminal ifthe
facilities are used exclusively to transfer hazardous liquid or carbon dioxide between
non-pipeline modes of transportation or between a non-pipeline mode and a pipeline.
These facilities do not include any device and associated piping that are necessary to
control pressure in the pipeline under §195.406(b); or
(10) Transportation ofcarbon dioxide downstream from the applicable following point:
50
(i) The inlet of a compressor used in the injection of carbon dioxide for oil recovery
operations, or the point where recycled carbon dioxide enters the injection system,
whichever is farther upstream; or
(ii)Theconnection of the first branch pipeline inthe production field where thepipeline
transports carbon dioxide to an injection well or to a header or manifold from which a
pipeline branchesto an injectionwell.
(c) Breakout tanks. Breakout tanks subject to this part must comply with requirements
thatapply specifically to breakout tanks and, to the extent applicable, with requirements
that apply to pipeline systems and pipeline facilities. If a conflict exists between a
requirement thatapplies specifically to breakout tanks and a requirement that applies to
pipeline systems or pipeline facilities, the requirement that applies specifically to
breakout tanks prevails. Anhydrous ammonia breakout tanks need not comply with
§§195.132(b), 195.205(b), 195.242 (c) and (d), 195.264(b) and (e), 195.307, 195.428(c)
and (d), and 195.432(b) and (c).
[73 FR 31644, June 3, 2008]







The Weyburnoilfield lies on the northwestern rim of Williston Basin, 16kmsouth east
of Weyburn. The oilfield began operation in 1954 and currently there are about 650
production and water injection wells in operation. Average daily crude oil is
2,900m3/day (about 18,200barrels/day). The Weyburn field produces about 10% of
EnCana's total oil production. Over its lifetimethe field has produced some 55 millions
m3 of oil from primary and water flood production. The field is in production decline,
having produced more than 25% ofthe estimated. In order to keep the field viable, CO2
injection began in 2000.
Figure Fl: Weyburn unit
In late 2000, CO2 injection was initiated at an initial injection rate of 2.69 million
m3/day into 19 patterns. By 2002, the rate of C02 injection increased to 3.39 million
m3/day including 0.71 million m3/day of CO2 recycled from oil production. The CO2-
EOR has contributed over 788m3/day (5000 barrels/day) to a total daily production of
3240m /day (20,560 barrels/day) for the entire Weyburn unit.
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Figure F2: The Weyburnfacilities where the main C02pipeline comesfrom Beulah,
North Dakota (Image courtesy ofPTRC)
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Figure HI: Maximum concentration
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Figure H6: Combined F-N curve
lEj__a___?»« =h














CVL onset: O —.
Averaging Time: Tonlcn~30 a)









































































































^ f3 *3 £1 B3 1N Fb s3 S5 %Ii i\iss ss ss.nift8S3$&S8-ii8nisas1%%1i H











I G.&M28e-*OOB m2 41)2502 ppm
I 103693o-HXB m2© S204ppm
13104*6m3©1.301e*004 ppm














































Dial! noo DowiTwin (m)

























































































Figure Hll: Probability offatality
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Figure 15: Maximum concentrationfootprint
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